ABOUT ME
I'm working on a computational model of moral cognition. I think moral judgments are determined by relevant nonmoral information, not moral values and norms. Is this a revolutionary claim? You tell me...
PUBLICATIONS
2022
Current Anthropology
Beal, Bree. "A Distinction Within 'Methodological Bracketing'."(Comment on Pohran) Current Anthropology, 63(6), 2022.
2022
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Beal, Bree. "The Polyphony Principle." Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, 2022, e222.
2021
Philosophical Psychology
Beal, Bree. "The Nonmoral Conditions of Moral Cognition." Philosophical Psychology, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1942811
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2021
Consciousness and Cognition
Beal, Bree and Guga Gogia. "Cognition in Moral Space: A Minimal Model." Consciousness and Cognition, 2021, 92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2021.103134.
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2020
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Beal, Bree. “What are the Irreducible Basic Elements of Morality? A Critique of the Debate over Monism and Pluralism in Moral Psychology.” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2020, 15(2), pp. 273-290. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619867106
2018
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Beal, Bree, and Philippe Rochat. “Innate Valuation, Existential Framing, and One Head for Multiple Moral Hats.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 41, 2018, p. e38., doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000632.
EDUCATION + EXPERIENCE
2012-2018
PhD
Emory University
Institute for the Liberal Arts
​I earned my PhD from Emory University's Institute for the Liberal Arts (ILA) in 2018. My dissertation was a "Dostoevskyan" model of moral psychology. While at Emory, I also did some cognitive neuroscience research in the Dilks Lab.
2010-2011
Master of Arts
Arizona State University
New College
I earned my Masters of Arts, with a focus on Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Literature, from Arizona State University's New College in Decemer, 2011.
2000-2004
Bachelor of Music
Grand Canyon State University
I earned a bachelor's of music, vocal performance, in 2004.
CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS
Ontological Frames vs. Moral Foundations
I'm working with psychologists Joshua Rottman to test the hypothesis that relevant nonmoral information will better predict moral judgments than "moral foundations."
The Case Against Morality as Cooperation
I'm currently working on a systematic refutation of the popular view that morality can be defined scientifically in terms of the function of cooperation.